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WiFi Roaming: Legal 
Implications and Security 
Constraints
Romain Robert 1, Mark Manulis 2, Florence De Villenfagne 3, 
Damien Leroy 4, Julien Jost 5, Francois Koeune 6, Caroline Ker 7, 
Jean-Marc Dinant 8, Yves Poullet 9, Olivier Bonaventure 10,   
and Jean-Jacques Quisquater 11
Abstract
WiFi technology has become the preferable form for mobile users to con-
nect to the Internet. The growing popularity of WiFi-enabled devices and 
the increasing number of WiFi networks guarantees that this trend will 
continue in the future. Since a single network provider is usually not able 
to ensure WiFi coverage for its own users across many geographic loca-
tions the WiFi roaming technology appears to be the promising solution. 
A special attention upon the practical deployment of WiFi roaming should 
be paid to possible threats coming from the misuse of technology. In this 
light we analyze various legal implications that might become relevant due 
to the deployment of WiFi roaming and discuss several risks and problems 
related to the security during the establishment of roaming connections 
between mobile devices and the Internet.
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During the last years, the number of WiFi networks and devices has quickly 
increased, both in office and home environments. Many laptops, mobile 
phones and gaming devices contain a WiFi interface and in many envi-
ronments, WiFi is becoming the default Internet access technology. The 
ubiquity of WiFi combined to the needs of users to be always connected 
leads to the interesting research area of WiFi roaming which investigates 
possibilities for network owners to provide Internet connection via their 
own WiFi access points to the mobile devices coming from other WiFi 
networks.
1.1  Application Scenarios
WiFi roaming is a service which can be deployed in various application 
scenarios, also with respect to the economical benefit of its users. In the 
following we present several use cases for WiFi roaming distinguished 
along its deployment in private, business, and academia areas.
1.1.1  WiFi roaming in private households
In urban areas many households today operate own WiFi networks with 
own broadband connection to the Internet. Therefore, a relatively cheap 
solution for the cities to setup areas of wide WiFi coverage with Internet 
access is to use the availability of these privately operated networks1. Set-
ting up such a system would require cooperation among the households 
in such a way that each cooperation participant who shares own network 
connection with its guests should also be able to use the connection offered 
by other participants in response. The initial realization of this approach 
can be found in Fon2 which is operated at the commercial basis.
1.1.2  WiFi roaming in business
In business area the use of WiFi roaming is especially promising since busi-
ness relationships among the companies today require employee mobility. 
Project meetings and cooperative work would benefit from the deploy-
ment of the WiFi roaming technology among the companies.
A special use case where the WiFi roaming solution becomes interest-
ing is the business sector of Internet providers. In each country there are 
usually several providers offering WiFi Internet access to their custom-
ers. However, there are only few providers that are capable to establish 
wide coverage areas. Therefore, many of them focus on specific points of 
1 N. SASTRY, K. SOLLINS, and J. CROWCROFT, ‘Architecting Citywide Ubiquitous Wi-Fi Access’, 
HotNets-VI, 2007.
2 Fon, http://www.fon.com









interest, e.g. airports, hotels, etc. Obviously, customers of one provider 
would benefit from the ability to use the Internet access offered by some 
other provider. The idea of using WiFi roaming among the Internet pro-
viders is comparable to the successfully deployed roaming in mobile tel-
ecommunication networks, e.g. GSM.
1.1.3  WiFi roaming in academia
In academia, especially in universities and research institutions WiFi roam-
ing technology would provide enormous benefits due to the frequent 
exchange of research personnel and students. Research stays are often of 
short duration so that the decrease of the respective administrative over-
head appears to be the desired goal. The solution developed by eduroam3 
allows employees or students affiliated to some educational institution 
which takes part in the cooperation to use the WiFi connection offered by 
another such institution with the very low administrative overhead.
1.2  Research challenges in WiFi roaming security and legal liability
A large number of technical mechanisms and industrial standards devel-
oped for (wireless) communication networks offer flexibility for the design 
of WiFi roaming solutions. However, these mechanisms and standards 
have been designed to fulfill particular technical tasks and have, there-
fore, own advantages and shortcomings when deployed in the real world 
with additional non-technical constraints such as misbehavior of users and 
legal responsibilities of operators.
It appears to be a challenging research task to design appropriate 
mechanisms for the realization of WiFi roaming in specific deployment 
environments such that the final solution is not only practical with respect 
to technological constraints but also provides sufficient protection against 
security threats and legal prosecution. Note that protection against these 
threats deserves especially strong attention due to the increasing misuse 
of the Internet connections for a variety of illegal activities.
From the security point of view sharing a WiFi connection comprises 
many risks and threats, both for the network and for the mobile devices. 
These risks may include traditional denial-of-service attacks, injection 
of malware, and sniffing of the sensitive information communicated by 
parties that are involved in the WiFi roaming process. Although in the 
past many WiFi access points have been configured without requiring any 
authentication from the connecting devices making the life of intruders 
easier, nowadays the trend moved towards protected networks for which 
various technical standards (IEEE 802.1X, 802.11i (WPA)) are available 
and supported by the majority of the access points and devices.
3 eduroam, http://www.eduroam.org











Another aspect that has a strong impact on security of WiFi roaming 
is the trust relationship among the WiFi networks and devices partici-
pating in the roaming process. In this context trust means that trusted 
parties have some pre-agreement concerning certain services that they 
have previously committed to provide to each other. This makes trust 
closely related to the ability of participants to authenticate each other 
before providing the agreed service. Note that well-reasoned trust 
assumptions between the WiFi networks can be regulated through the 
adequate legal contracts and contribute to the overall efficiency of 
WiFi roaming solutions making them more practical, and thus widely 
acceptable. In general, less trust involves a need for more complex 
security mechanisms.
Legal issues related to WiFi roaming may arise with respect to the need 
for identification of end users, formerly established relationship between 
the respective participating networks, but also related to the drafting of 
the contractual documents to be concluded between the parties involved 
in the process. Especially, liability and caution obligations of network 
owners might represent a serious concern due to the increasing misuse 
of the Internet by its users, e.g., up- and download activities for the ille-
gal contents including copyright-protected digital information and child 
pornography. The question raised here is related to the network owners’ 
obligations and liability for allowing access to the Internet through their 
network. Investigation on potential forms of liability cases and recommen-
dations of protective legal measures represent an interesting interdiscipli-
nary research direction which may involve joint activities of lawyers and 
technicians.
Another significant research aspect of WiFi roaming worth being 
payed attention to is that network owners usually have expenses for 
purchasing their connection bandwidth. Therefore, it appears also 
important to identify benefits for network owners to share own connec-
tion with other parties. The lack of appropriate business models and 
incentives for network owners to participate in the WiFi roaming proc-
ess may cause obstacles for a successful deployment of this technology 
in practice.
1.3  Focus and organization
In this paper we identify some general scenarios, use-cases for the deploy-
ment of WiFi roaming solutions among different WiFi networks.
The general WiFi roaming problem and notations used throughout the 
paper are described in Section 2.
In Section 3 we start with the simplistic WiFi roaming approach where 
an owner of a WiFi network grants a direct Internet access to a mobile 
device which remains under the administrative control of another 
WiFi network. For this scenario we differentiate between appropriate 










security and legal concerns from the perspective of the participating 
WiFi network and mobile device, describe possible real-life deploy-
ment scenarios and sketch business models for the network owner to 
share own connection, and provide a brief description of technology 
which could be used for the practical realization. Additionally, we give 
an overview of currently existing solutions related to this type of WiFi 
roaming and analyze them with respect to the identified security and 
legal requirements.
Backed by the identified shortcomings of this naive approach, in Sec-
tion 4 we focus on a more sophisticated scenario which assumes coopera-
tion of the involved WiFi networks such that a mobile device obtains a 
tunnel access to the WiFi network which has the administrative control 
over this device. The actual connection to the Internet is then granted to 
this device from the network at the end of the tunnel. In short, the tun-
neled connection appears to be promising from the legal point of view. 
At the same time it involves more participants, and is, therefore, more 
challenging from the technical point of view. In the context of this tun-
neled WiFi roaming approach we proceed similar as in the previous case. 
We discuss various security and legal requirements from the perspective 
of all participants (this time including the network to which the tunnel is 
opened) give an overview of possible practical realizations using today’s 
technology, describe and analyze available solutions with respect to the 
identified security and legal requirements.
We conclude our paper in Section 5 summarizing the advantages and 
disadvantages of both WiFi roaming approaches from the perspective of 
security and law.
2  The WiFi roaming problem
2.1  Definitions
Throughout this paper we use the following notations. By N  = {N1, … , Nn} 
we denote a set of WiFi networks that may be involved into the roaming 
agreement. Each network Ni is assumed to be responsible for the adminis-
trative control over the set of WiFi access points APi = {APi,1, … , APi,p} and 
WiFi enabled mobile devices Mi = {Mi,1, … ,Mi,m}.
An authentication authority denoted AA is an Internet service that can be 
questioned in order to authenticate a WiFi network as part of N. In the 
roaming process, it can be used by a guest network to verify the authentic-
ity of the home network Ni of some mobile device Mi,k. Similarly, AA can 
be used by Mi,k or Ni to check whether the guest network Nj is part of N. 
The authentication authority AA is assumed to be a trusted in the sense 
that it correctly authenticates participating WiFi networks. This service is 
not necessarily centralized; it may be a distributed hierarchy of AA servers, 
each administrated by one of participating networks.










2.2  Main phases
The WiFi roaming problem can be abstractly expressed as follows: some 
device Mi,k, having a home network Ni ∊ N , moves into the area covered by 
a guest network Nj ∊ N and executes the admission procedure to obtain 
Internet access. In general, the whole process can be split into two phases 
described in the following.
2.2.1  Registration phase
We consider the registration phase as an interactive protocol between Mi,k 
and Ni at the end of which both parties establish some security association 
(SA), that is Mi,k and Ni obtain some information that they can use later to 
recognize each other as a hosted device and a home network, respectively. 
We also assume that AA is able to authenticate every network from N.
2.2.2  Admission phase
The actual phase of the WiFi roaming which should be executed between 
Mi,k and a guest network Nj (possibly with the assistance of Ni and/or AA) 
in order to establish the Internet connection for Mi,k is called the admis-
sion phase. We consider the admission phase as an interactive protocol 
between Mi,k, Nj, AA and Ni, which is invoked by the connection request of 
Mi,k and at the end of which Nj decides whether to accept this request or to 
decline it. The two key arguments for the decision of Nj are the authenti-
cation of Ni as part of N and the authentication of Mi,k as an actual mobile 
node registered at Ni.
For the authentication of Ni as a legitimate partner of the roaming 
agreement, there are three different approaches:
 O Nj obtains necessary authentication information directly from Mi,k 
(without interaction with Ni or AA).
 O Nj obtains necessary authentication information directly from Ni 
(without interaction with AA).
 O Nj contacts AA which authenticates Ni.
For the authentication of the mobile device Mi,k as a device registered at 
Ni, we consider two approaches :
 O Nj obtains necessary authentication information directly from Mi,k 
(without interaction with Ni).
 O Nj contacts Ni which authenticates Mi,k.
Once admission phase has been performed, we distinguish between two 
scenarios depending on the way by which Mi,k is granted access to the 
Internet. In the first WiFi roaming scenario we deal with considers a direct 







access, that is the Internet connection to Mi,k is granted directly by the 
guest network Nj. Our second WiFi roaming scenario aims at a tunnel access 
such that Nj opens a tunnel between Mi,k and its home network Ni and the 
actual connection to the Internet is then granted by Ni.
In the following we focus on the analysis of WiFi roaming admission 
scenarios with direct and tunnel access modes from the perspective of 
security requirements, various legal aspects, and some practical considera-
tions with respect to the technical realization.
3  WiFi roaming with direct access
3.1  Overview
Fig. 1 depicts possible steps for the WiFi roaming process in the case of 
direct Internet access. The mobile device Mi,k approaches the guest net-
work Nj and connects to one of its access points APj,q. Then, a global access 
request is sent to Nj which can decide to accept or refuse it. This decision 
can be based on either a local authentication decision (steps 2 and 3 are 
void in this case) or a delegated one. For the delegated one, Nj contacts AA 
to authenticate the mobile home network Ni (step 2). If needed, Ni can be 
requested to assert that the mobile user does really belong to it (step 3).
We stress that the actual admission protocol may consist of several 
packet exchanges with intermediate local computations. It could also be 
possible that during step 2 AA exchanges data with the home network Ni 
in order to supply directly full authentication information to Nj.
Mi,k is allowed to access the whole Internet if, at the end of the admis-
sion phase, Nj authorizes Mi,k to use its own connection. Every subsequent 
message of Mi,k to the Internet and every response will be forwarded by Nj 
accordingly (steps 4 and 5).
It is worth to notice that any host on the Internet sees Mi,k as a host of Nj.
Figure 1. WiFi Roaming with Direct Access











3.2  Trust relationship between participants
The abstract WiFi roaming protocol with direct access to the Internet 
introduced in the previous section captures different realization scenar-
ios depending on the assumed trust relationship between its participants 
Mi,k, Ni, and Nj. In the setting of WiFi roaming with direct access to the 
Internet we consider trust as a factor used by the guest network Nj in its 
decision on whether to grant Mi,k the Internet access or decline the cor-
responding request. In fact, we assume that if some sufficient trust rela-
tionship between Mi,k and Nj can be established then the connection will 
be granted. By sufficient trust relationship we mean the guarantees that 
Nj can obtain with respect to the provided roaming service. Hence, there 
is a link between the establishment of the sufficient trust relationship and 
the aspects of security and legality. From the security point of view the 
trust establishment process is closely related to the authentication of the 
mobile device towards the guest network whereas from the legal point 
the sufficiency of this trust relationship can be strengthened by the corre-
sponding legal relationship between the guest and the home network.
3.2.1  Trust relationship between Mi,k and Ni
In general we assume that there is some pre-established trust relation-
ship between the mobile device Mi,k and its home network Ni as a result 
of the registration phase. In particular, this implies that Ni is aware of the 
identities of all Mi,k and whenever Ni is asked to confirm Mi,k as its hosted 
device it will act accordingly. This includes the case where some Mi,k has 
been revoked by Ni so that after its revocation it loses the status of being a 
legitimate host of Ni.
3.2.2  Trust relationship between Nj and Ni
When dealing with the pre-established trust relationship between Nj and 
Ni we consider two distinct cases.
The first case assumes that both networks are untrusted, i.e., there is 
no pre-agreement between Nj and Ni concerning the roaming service. 
Speaking in terms of identities this case implies that neither Nj nor Ni can 
identify each other as legitimate partners for the roaming service. For this 
case we also assume that no third party, such as the authentication author-
ity AA, exists that can be used to establish any indirect trust relationship 
between Nj and Ni. The existence of such AA is thinkable in scenarios 
where Nj and Ni are not aware of each other as roaming partners but have 
both pre-agreements with AA in that they agree to provide the roaming 
service to any network which also has such pre-agreement with AA. In 
particular, this case where Nj and Ni are treated as untrusted may apply in 
scenarios where no contracts for the roaming service exist and networks 
have to decide ‘on the fly’ whether to provide roaming to Mi,k or not.










The second case considers that both networks are trusted, i.e., they 
share some pre-agreement that regulates the roaming service and are able 
to identify each other as legitimate partners for the roaming service. This 
pre-agreement might exist between Nj and Ni directly or via some third 
party as described before.
3.2.3  Trust relationship between Mi,k and Nj
For the WiFi roaming with direct Internet access we assume that whenever 
Mi,k approaches the guest network Nj asking for a connection to the Inter-
net there is no initial trust relationship between them. We consider the 
establishment of such relationship as the goal of the admission phase.
Whether this goal can be achieved or not depends much on the assumed 
trust relationship between the networks Nj and Ni. If the corresponding 
trust relationship is missing, i.e., Nj is not able to identify Ni as a legitimate 
roaming partner, then it is unlikely for Nj to be able to establish suffi-
cient trust relationship with Mi,k. This applies in situations where users 
equipped with mobile devices approach some unknown guest network 
and ask for the Internet access.
To the contrary existing direct or indirect (via some authentication 
authority AA) trust relationship between Ni an Nj can be used for the 
establishment of the sufficient trust relationship between Mi,k and Nj 
since one of the goals for Nj during the admission phase would be to 
identify Mi,k as a legal host of Ni. Whether this identification requires 
assistance of Ni or can be done without any interaction between Nj 
and Ni is a matter of technical realization. The described case applies 
in scenarios where an employee of a company that has signed some 
regulatory contract for WiFi roaming service with another company 
approaches the network of that second company and requests the 
Internet connection.
3.3  Legal aspects
This first scenario based on a direct access to the Internet bears several 
legal issues that have to be taken into account to make a correct assess-
ment before thinking about the scenario’s actual implementation. The 
legal issues will obviously be linked to four main issues: liability issues, con-
tractual issues, issues related to telecommunication regulation and data 
protection issues.
As a principle, one cannot conclude in advance that the direct access 
scenario will be one bearing more legal issues than the tunnel access sce-
nario described in Chapter 4 of the present contribution. This is why it is 
of importance to make an in-depth analysis of the legal issues and their 
consequences at this stage. The same step will then be made for the sec-
ond scenario (see Section). This will allow a correct comparison at a legal 









point of view and allow us to conclude on the risks and opportunities, the 
pros and cons to implement one or the other proposed scenario in the 
real world.
In order to be as much comprehensible as possible, we shall subdivide 
the legal analysis by analyzing separately the four main themes already 
mentioned: liability issues (1), contract issues (2), telecommunication 
issues (3), and finally, data protection issues (4).
It is understood that the current paper is limited to a first outline of 
legal issues. They are being analyzed more in depth in the context of the 
research project of which this paper is a first result.
3.3.1  Liability for illegal content
When technically detailing the direct access scenario, one can easily iden-
tify that a high risk for the guest network Nj would be its possible liability 
in the case of a malicious use of the Internet by Mi,k. Indeed, as already 
mentioned, Mi,k is seen by any host on the Internet as a host of Nj (see 
chapter 3.1. above) and not as a host of Ni. Would this mean that Nj will be 
liable for Mi,k’s behavior on the Internet? The answer to such question will 
of course heavily influence a company’s decision on granting or not such 
direct access to an external host. As a principle, and on a European level, 
the solution is to be found in the so-called ‘e-commerce Directive’.4&5  
This Directive states out two important principles regarding the liability 
and obligations of Internet intermediaries with respect to the information 
transmitted.
The first principle confirms that no information society provider (e.g. 
Internet intermediaries) shall be imposed a general obligation to monitor 
the information which they transmit or store, nor to seek facts or circum-
stances indicating illegal activity.
The second principle provides for an exemption of liability for certain 
intermediary services providers regarding the information transmitted 
when their activity is of a mere technical, passive and neutral nature. This 
exemption only applies to the service providers offering mere conduit, 
caching and hosting services.
In the direct access scenario examined here, we are of the opinion that 
the role of the guest network should be considered as a provider of mere 
conduit services. Indeed, under article 12 of the e-commerce Directive, a 
mere conduit service is defined as an
4 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (’Direc-
tive on electronic commerce’), Official Journal, L 178, 17/07/2000, pp. 1-16.
5 In Belgium, this Directive has been transposed in the Belgian Law on e-commerce of 11 March 2003 : la 
Loi du 11 mars 2003 (http://mineco.fgov.be/information\_society/e-commerce/legislation/regulation/
law\_e\_commerce\_001.pdf) sur certains aspects juridiques des services de la société de l’information - M. 
B., 17/03/2003.









‘information society service that consists of the transmission in a communication 
network of information provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of 
access to a communication network’.
The ‘e-commerce Directive’ provides that providers of such a mere con-
duit services shall not be liable for the information transmitted, provided 
that the provider:
1. does not initiate the transmission;
2. does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
3.  does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.
If all these conditions are met, the service provider - the guest network 
- will not be liable for the information transmitted, up and downloaded 
through its Wi-Fi access point by the user of the roaming services.6 How-
ever, the Directive (and the Belgian law on e-commerce) also provides 
that this limitation of liability is without prejudice to the possibility for 
courts or national authorities of requiring the Service provider to termi-
nate or prevent an infringement. Should this occurs, the guest network 
will of course be obliged to have an active control on Mi,k’s activity when 
using it’s WiFi access point (e.g. by setting up a filtering system allowing to 
block access to some content).
3.3.2  Contractual issues
Trust and legal relationship between the networks Ni and Nj Neither statu-
tory provision nor legal principles oblige different parties involved in 
a project to conclude an agreement in order to set out the legal basis 
of their relationship.7 However, with respect to the trust relationships 
as described in the direct access scenario, one would argue that the 
existence of a pre-existing legal relationship between both networks 
would be an asset in order to precise the rights and obligations of these 
networks regarding the access that they mutually decided to offer to 
each other.
Indeed, the liabilities and obligations of both networks regarding, 
among others, the grant of access, SLA, prevention of hacking, data reten-
tion or appropriate diligence should be clearly stated in a binding docu-
ment, in order to establish the specific roles of each network within the 
roaming system.
6 The same reasoning can be applied for the liability of the home network: we also assume that its role 
can be limited to providing a mere conduit service and that it will then also benefit from the general li-
ability exemption rule detailed above.
7 Except in the case of the processing of personal data on behalf of another person considered as the 
controller of the processed data. In this case, the Data protection law requires that the parties conclude a 
written agreement stating out the obligations that must be followed by the processor.











In addition to the legal advantage of having a legally binding document 
between all parties involved, the technical specifications allowing Nj to 
recognize Mi,k as an authorized user should also be gathered in a written 
document that should be accepted in advance by any involved party: this 
could allow Mi,k to be certain that he can access the Internet through any 
guest network every time and at the sole condition that Mi,k complies with 
the specifications established by the roaming procedure.
These specifications can also be made publicly available on the Inter-
net, so that anyone can implement them on its hardware device to be 
able, technically, to access the Internet through a guest network. However, 
choosing this option will not necessarily lead to a legally binding obliga-
tion for the guest network to accept all potential end-users to access the 
Internet through their WiFi network.
Therefore, without a legally binding document between the networks 
at stake, the end-users of mobile devices cannot be guaranteed that they 
will be given access to the guest network, even if they meet all the specific 
requirements put forward to take part in the roaming network. This is 
still another point pleading for the existence of pre-existing agreements 
between the networks involved.
As already said here above, the relationship (also called the ‘trust 
relationship’) can either be performed by means of mutual agreements 
between every network operator, or by asking a third legal entity (AA) to 
conclude separate contracts with each operator.
This last option seems easier to set up since the operators do not have 
to know each other before granting mutual access to their respective net-
works. The third party (AA) could intervene as a trusted party whose func-
tion would be to make sure that pre-existing agreements exist between 
all networks that wish to participate in the roaming project. This way, any 
member of the participating networks could have the certainty to be able 
to access the other networks involved since proper binding documents are 
accepted by all the networks.
These documents shall therefore be enforceable by the trusted party 
(AA) towards the participating networks: (AA) shall be entitled to claim 
before a Court that the networks meet the technical, legal and operational 
requirements stated out in the document.
One can also imagine - through an appropriate clause - giving the home 
networks the right to take legal action towards the guest networks in case 
of violation of their roaming obligations. Therefore, Ni would no longer 
be obliged to address itself to (AA) in order to get the enforcement of Nj’s 
obligations.
Legal relationship between Mi,k and networks Ni and Nj It might hap-
pen that a document relating to the permitted and prohibited use of 
the Internet and the access to the home network already exist between 
the home network and its device Mi,k. This document can be e.g. an 










employment agreement, which is a legally binding agreement where all 
rights and obligations of the employers and the employees are stated.
Therefore, Mi,k could already be subject to an Internet and network use 
policy imposed by its home network Ni. In order to precise what usage will 
be allowed regarding the WiFi roaming solution, Ni could precise in this 
pre-existing document the conditions under which Mi,k will be authorized 
to access a guest network. These precisions can for example consist of 
the obligation to use a hardware approved by Ni before accessing a guest 
network.
With respect to the need of an agreement between Mi,k and the network 
Nj, we do not think that such an agreement is necessary since both net-
works can already rely on an existing document (either a bilateral agree-
ment or a document signed with a third party (AA)) to make sure that 
their devices can access to other guest networks.
Specific contractual issues Some Internet providers’ terms and condi-
tions prohibit the resale or public distribution of the internet connection 
provided to the end user. Allowing third people to access the Internet via 
a WiFi connection could therefore constitute a breach of this contractual 
prohibition. As a consequence, the guest network Nj could be liable for 
breach of contract and its Internet provider could accordingly decide to 
disconnect Nj for non-compliance with the Internet access terms and con-
ditions. Moreover, Ni and Mi,k could also be held liable for contributory 
breach of contract in case they were aware of the prohibition to share Ni’s 
internet access.
In order to avoid such a risk, the legal document binding the par-
ties should impose the participating networks to warranty that they are 
allowed by their access provider to share their Internet access with users 
other than the regular members of Nj.
3.3.3  Liability issues
Providing a WiFi access through one’s network is an activity that can raise 
some liability issues since potential hackers or end users can try to ben-
efit from the network of roaming party in order to attack the system of 
another roaming party. We will hereunder resume the key elements of the 
civil liability regime in order to understand what risks are at stake in the 
course of the sharing of a WiFi network connection.
As general liability principle, a rule of reasonable prudence and dili-
gence (a so-called ‘duty of care’) has to be observed by any person or 
entity in the course of its activities. The level of caution and prudence 
that has to be met depends on the risks and the nature of the activity. A 
lack of such caution and diligence shall be considered as a fault accord-
ing to civil liability law. Obviously, regarding activities such as granting 
access to WiFi networks, the duty of care should be focused on security 
of the network.







As a consequence, networks operators can be held liable for any dam-
age that is the consequence of a lack of precaution (such as, among oth-
ers, apparent breach in the security system, or bad administration of the 
system) and that would not have occurred if appropriate measures were 
implemented.
Therefore, in order to identify precisely which network will have to take 
specific measures in order to avoid potential damages and security risks, 
proper specifications should be drafted in order to incorporate them into 
the documents legally binding towards the involved networks and referred 
to hereunder.
3.3.4  Telecommunication issues
A specific European regulatory framework8 covers economic activities in 
the field of electronic communications (i.e. the conveyance of signals by 
electromagnetic means). This framework must be transposed in national 
laws. In Belgium it is (mainly9) transposed into the federal Law of 13 June 
2005 on electronic communications.10
According to this (European and Belgian) regulatory framework for 
electronic communications, an electronic communications network means
‘transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or routing 
equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of sig-
nals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, 
8 Mainly composed of six directives: Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33-50; Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 
16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services, 
OJ L 249, 17.9.2002, p. 21-26; Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation 
Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21-32; Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities (Access Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7-20; Directive 2002/22/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 
51-77; Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37-47, as amended by Di-
rective 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention 
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic com-
munications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 
105, 13.4.2006, p. 54-63.
9 We have here to notice that the (cultural) Communities also play a legislative role in the field of 
electronic communications. They are indeed competent regarding broadcasting contents and the trans-
mission of broadcasting signals while the federal State regulates other forms of transmission by electro-
magnetic means.
10 Loi du 13 juin 2005 relative aux communications électroniques, M.B., 20 June 2005, 2nd ed. On this 
federal level are some parts of the Law of 21 March 1991 (M.B., 27 March 1991) still in application. If 
these two laws rule the market, the Belgian federal regulatory authority (IBPT) is mainly organized by a 
law of 17 January 2003 (M.B., 24 January 2003, 3rd ed., err. 4 June 2003).









including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, includ-
ing Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, 
to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, 
networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable televi-
sion networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed’.
As an electronic communications service means
‘a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or 
mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications net-
works, including telecommunications services and transmission servic-
es in networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or 
exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic 
communications networks and services […]’.
On this basis we can conclude that providing access to a WiFi network 
could imply the provision of an electronic communications service consist-
ing in the conveyance of signals by means of an electronic communications 
network.
General authorization The national regulation may foresee a number of 
general conditions to be fulfilled by those who want to provide electronic 
communications services and to operate electronic communications net-
works. However these activities do not require any individual right but 
may only be subject to a ‘general authorization’. This means that such 
economic activity may only require a prior notification and of course the 
respect of the regulation. A specific and individual authorizing decision 
from the regulatory authorities is therefore not needed.11
Promoting R-LANs The European Commission adopted a Recommenda-
tion in March 200312 urging to facilitate the use of WiFi networks or the 
so called Radio Local Area Networks (R-LANs) and therefore to allow the 
provision of R-LAN access to public electronic communications networks 
and services on a commercial basis under the least onerous system, i.e., to 
the extent possible without any specific conditions.
Public or private communications services or networks The regulatory frame-
work at stake and the rules related to general authorization apply to all 
electronic communications and networks, whether public or private. This 
does not mean that the same conditions are applied to both categories. 
Indeed, in the case of networks and services not provided to the public it 
11 See nevertheless the comments made hereunder regarding rights of use for radio frequencies.
12 Recommendation 2003/203 of 20 March 2003 on the harmonization of the provision of public R-
LAN access to public electronic communications networks and services in the Community, OJEU, L 078 of 
25 March 2003. A recommendation is not formally binding for the Member States (see art 249 EC Treaty). 
It has however a certain legal consequences. In the case of this Recommendation based on article 19 of 
the Framework Directive the Member States have in particular to ensure that national regulatory authori-
ties take the utmost account of it in carrying out their tasks. And where a national regulatory authority 
chooses not to follow a recommendation, it has to inform the Commission giving the reasoning for its 
position.








is appropriate to impose fewer and lighter conditions than are justified 
for electronic communications networks and services provided to the pub-
lic.13 A general overview of the regulation makes clear that the number of 
conditions applicable to private activities is limited.14 Only few conditions 
can be attached to a general authorization to provide private services15: 
the payment of an eventual administrative tax; the obligation to respect 
the environment, or town and country planning rules; and the obligation 
to ensure safety, security and continuity of the network.
In this context we note that Belgium made use of the possibility to 
exempt some electronic communications activities from prior notifica-
tion and therefore from most of the obligations linked to this notification. 
This is first the case with the operation of networks that don’t cross the 
public domain.16
It should furthermore be emphasized that specific obligations may be 
imposed on providers of electronic communications services and net-
works e.g. with regard to universal service or with regard to the provision 
of access (including interconnection) with one own resources. The latter 
obligations nevertheless only apply to providers of public electronic com-
munications networks.
As a consequence it appears that the qualification of a network (and of 
the service provided through this network) as public or not is of crucial 
importance.
In accordance with the Framework Directive, public communications 
network means an
‘electronic communications network used wholly or mainly for the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services’.
The term of public is not explicitly defined in the regulatory framework 
but the European Commission gave in 1995 some guidance on this con-
cept.17 According to the Commission, ‘for the public’ must be understood 
in its common sense meaning of ‘available to all members of the public 
on the same basis’. Working than on an a contrario reasoning she rather 
defined what is not public. In this approach are for examples not for the 
public the corporate networks (connecting a company and its subsidiaries 
or its branches) and the closed user groups (CUGs).18 A CUG is a group 
13 Authorisation Directive, recital 16.
14 P. NIHOUL, P. RODFORD, EU Electronic Communications Law - Competition and Regulation in the 
European Telecommunications Market, OUP, 2004, p. 115, 2.136.
15 See Authorisation Directive, Annex, Letter A, points 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 16.
16 Law of 13 June 2005 on electronic communications, art. 9, §5.
17 See Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the status 
and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services, OJ, C 275, 20 October 1995, p. 5. The idea than developed may still considered useful today.
18 Ibid. at 8. For further explanations on these networks in particular (in the context of voice telepho-
ny), see P. LAROUCHE, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Hart Publishing, 
2000, 10-14 and 24-26.










formed by members who have an economic relationship or a common 
interest which is pre-existing, extraneous to their actual telecommunica-
tion needs. The public nature of the service does however not depend on 
which information the user will have access to: Internet, local network.
We have to keep in mind that this qualification (public or not) has to 
be clearly distinguished to another one: the existence of remuneration.19 
This criterion is essential for the qualification of electronic communica-
tions service and thus the application of the whole regulatory framework 
which only covers economic activities as a secondary legislation of the EC 
Treaty. It should be noted that these services do not necessarily have to 
be paid for by the person for whom they are performed.20 The essential 
characteristic of remuneration ‘lies in the fact that it constitutes consid-
eration for the service in question, and is normally agreed upon between 
the provider and the recipient of the service’.21 Thereby in the case of an 
exchange relationship (in which the partners would mutually give access 
to each other’s network), one could be considered that access is given 
against payments which compensate each other.
As a preliminary conclusion to the analysis made above, it appears that 
the exact qualification of the network and the precise legal position of 
the person who would open his WiFi access points to outside users with 
direct access to internet and to the operator of the backbone network 
will mostly depend on the concrete implementation of the WiFi roaming: 
would the service be provided against payment, would the access be open 
to anyone?
Consequently it is our impression that provided that the service is 
offered for remuneration (what is a priori not decided), this direct access 
scenario could be considered as a ‘public network scenario’: The group 
of different persons who would open up their respective networks seem 
not to be subsidiary to a single corporation activity neither to a CGU. 
The users which could have access to the WiFi network are not limited 
in advance to a certain category of beneficiaries. In our understanding a 
service could be considered as provided to anyone even if all these per-
sons are asked to fill in a prior registration. This registration could in fact 
be open to everyone interested in this service (and who agree with the 
terms of use thereof) and would as such not limit the circle of persons 
admitted to the service.
Each WiFi network could individually be used for the provision of pub-
licly available electronic communications services. But to conclude that 
these networks are also to be qualified as public, we have first to deter-
mine their main use: private or public.
19 See the definition of the electronic communications service hereabove.
20 See K. LENAERTS and PIET VAN NUFFEL, Constitutional Law of the European Union (2nd ed.), 
Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005, 227.
21 European Court of Justice, Case 283/86 Humbel, 27 September 1988, para. 17.








Use of radio-frequencies In addition to the general authorization, the Euro-
pean regulatory framework allows Member States to make the use of radio 
frequencies subject to the grant individual rights of use. The allocation of 
this kind of resources needs to be strictly managed because of the need to 
ensure the efficient use of such scarce resource and of the possible exist-
ence of technical problems like harmful interferences.
Nevertheless in order to not increase the administrative burden upon 
potential network operators such individual rights of use may only be 
required when necessary. Member States are thus required, where possi-
ble, and in particular where the risk of harmful interference is negligible, 
not to make the use of radio frequencies subject to the grant of individual 
rights of use. Such considerations have led the European Commission to 
recommend that the use of available 2.4 and 5 Ghz bands22 should not 
be subject to the grant of individual rights for the operation of R-LAN 
systems23. The conditions for usage of such radio frequencies will in such 
case be included in the general authorization. This license-free use is a 
clear advantage of WiFi networks that participates in the success of this 
wireless communication standard.
3.3.5  Data protection issues
Processing personal data The issues to be tackled regarding data protection 
are mainly to identify whether one or another party is actually processing 
personal data during the ’direct access’ process. Such processing needs 
indeed to be performed in accordance with the national rules transpos-
ing the general Data Protection Directive 95/46.24
The analysis of the first scenario allows us to conclude that - what the 
guest network concerns - some personal data are being processed25 during the 
22 R-LAN may use all or part of either the 2400,0 - 2483,5 MHz or the 5150-5350 MHz or 5470-5725 MHz 
bands. The Commission decided to make these two last frequency bands available in all Member States for 
wireless access systems (see Commission Decision 2005/513/EC of 11 July 2005 n the harmonized use of 
radio spectrum in the 5 GHz frequency band for the implementation of Wireless Access Systems including 
Radio Local Area Networks (WAS/RLANs), OJ, L 238 of 15 September 2005, as amended by Commission De-
cision 2007/90/EC of 12 February 2007, OJ, L 41 of 13 February 2007, p. 10). This decision is implemented 
in Belgian national law by Ministerial Decree of 22 December 2004 amending Ministerial Decree of 19 Octo-
ber 1979 relating to private radio-communications, annex 3 (interface radio B3), M.B., 7 January 2005.
23 See the above mentioned R-LAN recommendation, point 1 and recital 9. Belgium followed this 
recommendation by adopting the Royal Decree of 13 February 2003 amending the Royal Decree of 15 
October 1979 relating to private radio-communications, M.B., 14 April 2003. This Decree exempts the use 
of these frequencies from any right of use. Earlier mentioned Ministerial Decree of 22 December 2004 
(see previous footnote) in his annex 3 furthermore submits this to limited general conditions (maximum 
effective isotropic power, inside use only for the 5470-5725MHz band etc.).
24 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31-50.
25 ’Processing of personal data’ shall mean any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal 
data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction; Article 1 of Directive 95/46/EC.









admission phase.26 Personal data can indeed be defined as being any infor-
mation relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (’data subject’)27. An 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particu-
lar by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
On the basis of these definitions, one can understand that during the 
admission phase personal data is exchanged between Nj and Mi,k. Even 
if this information is not directly the name of the user of Mi,k, it how-
ever allows the identification of this person quite easily: the information 
exchanged, even with cryptography, contains enough elements to identify 
precisely a device Mi,k which can be linked to its user by Ni.
28
In this direct access scenario, personal data is also exchanged at the 
time Mi,k is accessing the Internet. At least traffic data is indeed processed 
by Nj as the messages of Mi,k to the Internet and every response need to be 
forwarded by Nj accordingly.
As a conclusion, one can identify two personal data processing opera-
tions that will be identified by using their purpose: the admission processing 
and - what we will call - the ‘web surfing’ processing.
Both these processing operations shall have to be performed accord-
ing to the obligations of the Data Protection Directive 95/46. This mainly 
includes the obligation to specify the purpose of the processing (as just 
has been done). This aim has to be legitimate and the data may not be 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. The person 
responsible for the processing (the so-called ’controller’ - Nj in this case) 
shall have to verify whether the processing is legitimate, deliver some 
information to the data subject (the user of Mi,k), notify the processing to 
the National Data Protection Authority, comply with obligations relating 
to the quality of the processed data and, comply with security and confi-
dentiality obligations.
Data retention Another legal issue is to precisely determine what are 
the obligations of Nj as regards the retention of traffic data. Indeed, one 
should notice that a European Directive on data retention has been 
adopted on 15 March 2006.29 This Directive provides that Member States 
have to adopt measures to ensure that some data (specified in Article 5 of 
the Directive) are retained when they are generated or processed by providers 
of publicly available electronic communications services or of a public communica-
tions network within their jurisdiction in the process of supplying the communications 
26 Please notice that personal data is of course processed during the registration phase. As this process-
ing is however not different from the processing of personal data performed by the home network for the 
management of the access to the Internet and/or the Intranet of the home network by Mi,k  when working 
intra muros, we did not analyse this question in the present paper.
27 Article 1 of Directive 95/46/EC
28 Please notice that the link does not have necessarily to be made by Nj.
29 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC.









services concerned.30 The data at stake is traffic and location data on both 
legal entities and natural persons and the related data necessary to identify 
the subscriber or registered user.31 The purpose of such retention has how-
ever been restricted to the use of such data for the purpose of the investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime.32 The data may be provided only to 
the competent national authorities in specific cases and in accordance to 
the law.
Therefore, in this direct access scenario, we can observe that the main 
question is to determine whether Nj can be considered as being a provider 
of publicly available electronic communications services and would hence be 
obliged to retain some data within a period of retention that shall be not 
less than six months and not more than two years from the date of the 
communication.33
According to the European Directive, the data to be retained will then 
be data a) necessary to trace and identify the source of a communica-
tion; b) data necessary to identify the destination of a communication; 
c) data necessary to identify the date, time and duration of a communi-
cation; d) data necessary to identify the type of communication; e) data 
necessary to identify users’ communication equipment or what purports 
to be their equipment; f) data necessary to identify the location of mobile 
communication equipment.34 The Directive precisely determines which 
data should be retained concerning Internet access, Internet e-mail and 
Internet telephony.
One shall notice that in Belgium, the European Directive has not been 
transposed yet. The Belgian law has however tackled the issue of data reten-
tion providing for a general rule in the Law of 13 June 2005 on electronic 
communications. This rule, applicable only to the so-called ’operators’, pro-
vides that some traffic and users’ identification data must be retained for the 
prosecution and suppression of penal offences in the framework of the search for […] 
the identity of people having maliciously used an electronic network or an electronic 
communication service.35 The data - that has to be specified in a Royal Decree 
executing the law - may be retained for a period of minimum 12 months 
and maximum 36 months. The Royal Decree however does not exist.
The Belgian law thereby foresees in certain circumstances that ’non 
operators’ could also have the obligation to register and keep traffic and 
user’s identification data for the prosecution and suppression of penal offences 
[…].36 The law is however not specifying in this case a minimum and 
30 Article 3 of Directive 2006/24/EC
31 The Directive is explicitly excluding the content of electronic communications, including informa-
tion consulted using an electronic communications network. (article 1)
32 Article 1 of Directive 2006/24/EC
33 Article 6 of Directive 2006/24/EC
34 Article 5 of Directive 2006/24/EC
35 Article 126 of the Law of 13 June 2005 on electronic communications.
36 Article 9 §7 of the Law of 13 June 2005.











maximum period of retention. Everything should be fixed by Royal Decree - 
Royal Decree that has not been adopted yet.
As all Royal Decrees are missing, one shall notice that excepting the 
fact that some data must be retained by operators, it is difficult to have 
more certainty and more precise knowledge about the kind of data to 
be retained and for which period of time. Reference should then best be 
made to the data described in the Data retention Directive 2006/24 (see 
above).
3.4  Security aspects
In this section we describe the main security concerns for the WiFi roam-
ing scenario with the direct access to the Internet provided by the guest 
network Nj to a mobile device Mi,k. We classify security goals from the per-
spective of the involved communication participants.
3.4.1  Device-oriented security goals
Mobile device Mi,k is interested in obtaining own connection to the Inter-
net. Therefore, it is less concerned about the authenticity of the guest 
network Nj as long as it can use the provided roaming service in order to 
execute remote applications. One of the problems that arises in this con-
text is that if Nj is malicious then it can try to eavesdrop the subsequent 
communication of Mi,k. Eavesdropping is a passive attack which is possible 
due to the ability of Nj to observe traffic within its infrastructure. This 
problem is especially appealing if the mobile device uses the established 
connection to transmit some valuable sensitive information (e.g. login 
credentials to access some application). Obviously, this is a threat against 
the confidentiality of the established communication channel. However, 
the same threat applies after the information leaves the infrastructure of 
Nj towards the specified destination on the Internet. Therefore, achieving 
confidentiality in case of the direct access to the Internet should not be 
seen as a requirement of the deployed WiFi roaming solution but rather 
as the requirement of the application which uses the established commu-
nication channel.
Another threat for Mi,k arises from possible active attacks performed 
by Nj such as traffic redirection resulting from the modification of the 
server’s address resolution or packets exchanged with Mi,k aiming to spoof 
some destination address on the Internet. For example, if the user behind 
the mobile device Mi,k uses the established connection to access an e-mail 
account on some server on the Internet the guest network Nj may try to 
spoof the destination address of that server in order to obtain login infor-
mation of the user and misuse it later for the distribution of spam. There-
fore, if a mobile device accesses some server on the Internet it should be 
able to verify that the corresponding destination address is authentic and 










that the server is not spoofed by Nj. Note that spoofing (and phishing) 
attacks on the Internet are general security threats that are independent 
of the actual WiFi roaming service. Therefore, similar to the requirement 
on confidentiality, the corresponding protection against spoofing attacks 
(through the deployment of authentication mechanisms between the 
mobile devices and Internet servers) are not integer to a concrete WiFi 
roaming security solution.
However, we stress that the responsibility for the recognition of poten-
tial spoofing and impersonation attacks to Mi,k (or to the user who owns 
this device) should be considered by the application running on top of the 
established connection. The application could deploy classical authentica-
tion techniques such as TLS-secured communication in order to achieve 
the requirements on authentication and confidentiality, i.e. to establish a 
secure end-to-end communication channel. Unfortunately, the majority 
of servers on the Internet today do not realize them in a sufficient form so 
that the number of successful impersonation and eavesdropping attacks 
has increased over the past years.
A more severe damage that can be caused by a malicious guest network 
Nj is that it may try to impersonate Mi,k towards some server on the Inter-
net and perform illegal activities on behalf of Mi,k so that the owner of 
the mobile device can be blamed for having performed these activities. It 
is important to mention here that the issue whether Mi,k can be blamed 
or not should be understood in the context of the legal liability. In fact it 
depends on the type of the evidence which should be provided in order to 
blame Mi,k for some illegal activities. Several types of evidence can be used 
in practice. First and probably the most secure one is to deploy certain 
cryptographic authentication mechanisms such as digital signatures. In 
this case the evidence can be given in form of a digital signature generated 
by a mobile device upon the establishment of the connection on some 
information specific to that connection. This information may include 
the source and the destination address from the connection request in 
addition to the time stamps that indicate the time when the connection 
has been established. Obviously, a successful impersonation attack of Nj 
against Mi,k and subsequent accusations against Mi,k would depend much 
on the ability of the guest network to forge the corresponding digital sig-
nature of the device. Another solution, which is less secure, but enjoys 
popularity in the GSM roaming, is to log details about the established con-
nections without using cryptography and to use the data from the log files 
for the identification of devices (and their owners) in the case of misuse. 
Obviously, this solution does not prevent malicious Nj from successfully 
modifying the logged data.
Another related threat arises in case that some contractual pre-agree-
ment concerning the WiFi roaming service between Nj and Ni exists and 
the admission phase is interactive in the sense that Ni has to confirm that 











Mi,k is one of its hosts. Then, Nj may also try to impersonate Mi,k towards 
Ni, thus making the home network believe that one of its hosts requested 
the roaming service from Nj when in fact no such request has been done. 
This can be seen as a security risk, especially, if the pre-agreement foresees 
payments for using the WiFi roaming service as in this case Nj may try to 
charge Ni for the unprovided service. In general both described attack sce-
narios can be classified as impersonation attacks against the mobile device 
for the only difference that in the latter case Mi,k is impersonated towards 
its home network Ni and not just to some server on the Internet. Obvi-
ously, a secure WiFi roaming solution upon the execution of its admission 
phase should prevent attacks that impersonate some mobile device Mi,k 
towards its home network Ni.
3.4.2  Guest Network-oriented security goals
One of the main goals for the guest network Nj upon providing the WiFi 
roaming service to Mi,k is to prevent possible liability blames for the 
illegal activities on the Internet that have been performed by Mi,k. In 
order to achieve this protection Nj should obtain some proof during the 
admission phase that would enable Nj to shift the responsibility for any 
misuse performed by Mi,k to its owner. Note that the form of this proof 
depends on the legal framework which applies to the WiFi roaming serv-
ice and can be realized via cryptographic authentication mechanisms 
such as digital signatures or through the corresponding logging of the 
information related to the established connection between Mi,k and the 
destinations on the Internet. In some sense, this goal can be seen as a 
counter-part of the device oriented goal on prevention of impersonation 
attacks against Mi,k.
Another important security risk for the guest network Nj is when a 
malicious device Mi,k wishes to harm the infrastructure of Nj. This 
includes possible infiltrations with malware as well as the risk of the 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. The infiltration with malware is rather 
independent of the actual WiFi roaming solution and can be prevented 
using standard access filtering techniques. As for the DoS attacks we dis-
tinguish between two types: attacks against the general infrastructure 
of Nj and attacks against the infrastructure which is responsible for the 
WiFi roaming service, e.g. the access points APj,q. Note that in case of the 
direct access malicious Mi,k can address its messages also to any server 
which belongs to the infrastructure of Nj so that possible DoS attacks 
against these servers should be prevented through the additional filter-
ing mechanisms. Obviously, this protection cannot be performed within 
the actual WiFi roaming admission protocol. On the other hand, DoS 
attacks against the WiFi roaming infrastructure such as attacks that aim 
to crash some access point APj,q should be prevented by the deployed 
WiFi roaming admission protocol.









3.4.3  Home Network-oriented security goals
In case of WiFi roaming with direct access to the Internet the home network 
Ni becomes active only if some WiFi roaming pre-agreement exists which 
includes Nj (and also Ni if the admission phase requires additional interac-
tion between Nj and Ni). The main purpose of this interaction could be the 
wish of Nj to obtain confirmation from Ni that Mi,k belongs to Ni and is eligible 
to use the provided WiFi roaming service. In this sense, the main threat for 
the home network Ni arises from possible impersonation attacks during such 
admission phase. However, these attacks are already considered within the 
specified device oriented security goal concerning the impersonation of Mi,k. 
If there is no pre-agreement between Nj and Ni or if the admission phase does 
not require interaction with Ni then no active participation of Ni is necessary. 
Therefore, there are no further security threats which are specific to Ni. Note 
that this is one of the main differences compared to the security concerns of 
Ni in case of WiFi roaming with tunnel access to the Internet.
3.5  Practical realization
This part describes mechanisms that can be used to realize wireless roaming 
with direct access. The whole solution can be divided into three building 
blocks. The first block deals with link-layer authorization and the security 
between the mobile node and the access point. The second block concerns 
the authentication of the mobile device and its home network. And finally, the 
third block is responsible for the full Internet access for the mobile device.
3.5.1  Link-layer authorization and security
For authentication and authorization at link layer, a commonly used solu-
tion is the IEEE standard 802.1X37. It prevents the mobile to send any 
data packet as soon as it has not been authorized. Authorization is based 
on authentication and local policy. In our direct access case, we typically 
accept any authenticated mobile from an authenticated partner network. 
WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access38) should be used in conjunction with 802.1X 
so that all the communication between Mi,k and APj,q is encrypted.
3.5.2  Authentication
In our situation, the authentication has to be performed with the con-
tribution of a third party, using a protocol such as RADIUS39. Since we 
have to authenticate the home network as well as the mobile identity, the 
37 802.1x-2004 IEEE standard for local and metropolitan area networks – Port-Based Network Access Control, IEEE, 2004.
38 802.11i-2004 IEEE Standard. Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) 
specifications. Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements. IEEE, 2004.
39 C. RIGNEY, S. WILLENS, A. RUBENS, and W. SIMPSON, ‘Remote Authentication Dial In User Serv-
ice (RADIUS)’, RFC 2138, IETF, June 2000.








authentication can be either performed by two different operations or by 
a single one using a RADIUS server hierarchy. Such kind of authentica-
tion is usually mutual and use protocols such as EAP-TLS.40
3.5.3  Internet access for the mobile node
In the direct case, the mobile node, once authenticated, receives an IP 
address of the guest network via DHCP41&42 or ND.43 Then, the full Inter-
net access of the mobile node is simply provided by forwarding its packets 
to the Internet. In order to avoid Mi,k accessing the guest network service 
with full access rights, appropriate firewall rules should be applied.
3.5.4  Technical issues
In addition to the legal issues of the direct access solution, some techni-
cal risks also appear. The IP address used by the mobile node to con-
nect to another host of the Internet is an IP address belonging to the 
guest network. The visiting host is thus associated to its guest network. For 
instance, if the guest network has an access to a digital library based on its 
IP address, the mobile will also have access. Even if the visitor is authenti-
cated, the action he performs on the Internet may have important conse-
quences for the guest network. If Mi,k sends spam through the Internet, Nj 
might be considered as a spam-sender network, that is put into the black-
list databases and possibly prevented from sending any e-mail.
3.6  Existing solutions
There exist several initiatives that suggest solutions for WiFi roaming with 
direct Internet access. These solutions can be classified in two main cat-
egories: Roaming with local authentication (step 2 in Fig. 1 is void in this 
case) and roaming with delegated authentication. We will not consider a 
connection to open WiFi networks as a roaming situation.
3.6.1  Roaming with ‘local authentication’
Local authentication is the most spread and simplest way to implement WiFi 
roaming, for instance this type of authentication is frequently used in WiFi net-
works offered by the hotels as well as for other public hotspots, e.g. in the airports. 
Local authentication can be either offline (e.g. with username/password as in 
many hotels) or online (e.g. using credit cards or similar payment methods).
40 B. ABOBA and D. SIMON, ‘PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol’, RFC 2716, IETF, Oct. 1999.
41 R. DROMS, ‘Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol’ RFC 2131, IETF, Mar. 1997.
42 R. DROMS, J. BOUND, B. VOLZ, T. LEMON, C. PERKINS, and M. CARNEY, ‘Dynamic Host Configu-
ration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)’, RFC 3315, IETF, July 2003.
43 T. NARTEN, E. NORDMARK, and W. SIMPSON, ‘Neighbor discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)’, RFC 
2461, IETF, Dec. 1998.









3.6.2  Roaming with ‘delegated authentication’
There exist several solutions which deploy the concept of delegated 
authentication. For instance, Fon2 runs on a commercial basis selling own 
WiFi routers that mediate the authentication of mobile devices wishing 
to obtain connectivity from a WiFi network to a FON server. FON routers 
split the WiFi signal creating a secure private channel to broadband inter-
net and a separate channel to be shared with the other users. However, 
Fon has several security threats44 - in particular the deployed address filter 
technique allows impersonation attacks by spoofing the corresponding 
addresses.
Wisher45, another commercial WiFi roaming provider, requires guest 
networks to distribute WEP/WPA keys to authorized guests. Obviously, 
this is an even riskier approach than Fon since it requires strong trust rela-
tionship that guests do not redistribute the obtained keys.
There are several solutions developed for the WiFi roaming in national 
research and education networks in Europe by the TERENA Task Force 
on Mobility.46 The most promising of the proposed solutions is eduroam3 
based on 802.1X authentication and RADIUS-server hierarchy. It deploys 
the federated approach where networks become members of a federation 
through some initial (possibly off-line) contractual agreement. Although 
member networks share some level of trust, they retain their own admin-
istrative control. In eduroam the initial account of a mobile device is cre-
ated at its home network, and whenever this device wishes to connect to 
another network its credentials are routed to the responsible RADIUS-
server of the home network which replies with the authentication result. 
Unfortunately, this service is only offered in research and education 
networks.
4  WiFi roaming with tunnel access
4.1  Overview
The possible steps of a WiFi roaming process with the tunnel access to 
the Internet are depicted in Fig. 2. The mobile device Mi,k approaches the 
guest network Nj and connects to one of its access points (APj,q). Then, Mi,k 
requests that Nj creates a tunnel to its own home network, Ni. This request 
(step 1), has at least to contain the information about the home network, 
e.g. its identity.
44 F. BJÖRCK, ‘Fon security scenarios’, http://www.bjorck.com/fon-security-scenarios.htm, January 
2007.
45 Wisher, http://www.wisher.com
46 TERENA TF on Mobility, http://www.terena.org/activities/tf-mobility/








The authentication with Nj is similar to the one in the direct case. More-
over, Ni has to authenticate and authorize Mi,k to use a tunnel to access the 
Internet through its network. If the request is accepted, we can consider 
that a tunnel is opened between Nj and Ni for Mi,k.
We stress that the security protocols executed between AA, Nj, Ni, 
and Mi,k do not necessarily consist of a single message exchange. They 
may contain more complex exchanges with intermediate local compu-
tations. They may also be useless in some cases where some information 
is implicitly known (using cache for instance). Through the opened 
tunnel, the mobile device Mi,k can connect to the whole Internet. The 
data packets sent from Mi,k (step 4) are tunneled to its home network Ni 
(step 5), and then forwarded to the destination server on the Internet 
(step 6). For any such server, Mi,k’s packets are delivered by Ni and the 
reverse traffic to Mi,k is sent first to Ni and then tunneled to the device 
via Nj.
4.2  Trust relationship between participants
The actual realization of the previously introduced abstract WiFi roam-
ing protocol with tunnel access to the Internet may also depend on the 
assumed trust relationship between Mi,k, Ni, and Nj. In this setting the 
notion of trust can be seen as a factor used by the guest network Nj in its 
decision on whether to grant Mi,k the tunnel access to the claimed home 
network Ni or not. Similar to the WiFi roaming case with direct Inter-
net access the establishment of some sufficient trust relationship between 
Mi,k and Nj is necessary for the granted tunnel connection. This sufficient 
trust relationship that can be substantiated prior to the roaming process 
through adequate legally binding documents (in a manner that is still 
to be defined, according to the decision to create a new legal entity or 
not) and established during the admission phase by some authentication 
Figure 2. WiFi Roaming with Tunnel Access










mechanisms which should provide Nj with guarantees with respect to the 
roaming service.
4.2.1  Trust relationship between Mi,k and Ni
As in the WiFi roaming case with direct Internet access we assume that 
some pre-established trust relationship between the mobile device Mi,k and 
its home network Ni exists as a result of the registration phase. Therefore, 
it is likely that Ni will always confirm that Mi,k is one of its hosted devices 
if asked by Nj, unless Ni revokes Mi,k. Besides that, we assume that Ni will 
grant the Internet connection to Mi,k if requested so by the device. Obvi-
ously, the authentication of Mi,k towards Ni becomes an important issue.
4.2.2  Trust relationship between Nj and Ni
Similar to WiFi roaming with direct Internet access we distinguish between 
two distinct cases.
The first case assumes that Nj and Ni are untrusted in that they do not 
share any pre-agreements concerning the roaming service. In particular, 
they cannot identify each other as legitimate roaming partners, neither 
directly nor indirectly through some third party acting as the authentica-
tion authority AA. In this case the guest network Nj has to decide whether 
to provide a tunnel access between Mi,k and some unknown network Ni, 
even if Ni is willing to accept the tunnel upon the identification of Mi,k as 
its legitimate host.
The second case assumes that Nj and Ni have some pre-established trust 
relationship in form of either direct or indirect (through an authentica-
tion authority AA) pre-agreements for the roaming service. This allows Nj 
to identify Ni as a legitimate partner for roaming and facilitate the decision 
of Nj concerning the establishment of the tunnel between Mi,k and Ni.
4.2.3  Trust relationship between Mi,k and Nj
The initial assumption at the beginning of the admission phase is that 
the approaching device Mi,k is untrusted by the guest network Nj. While 
executing the admission phase Nj should be able to decide whether a suf-
ficient trust relationship to Mi,k can be established and the tunnel access 
to Ni granted.
This depends on the trust relationship between Nj and Ni. If the corre-
sponding trust relationship is missing, then Nj can treat Ni as an unknown 
network which cannot be identified as a legitimate roaming partner. This 
makes the case comparable to that for the direct Internet access except 
that Nj has to decide not about granting the Internet connection but about 
granting the tunnel to reach Ni. Note, however, that since Ni is unknown 
it can also be any destination of the Internet. This may cause additional 
legal implications.










Otherwise, if Nj and Ni are trusted and can identify each other as a 
legitimate roaming partner then it is also possible for Nj to establish the 
necessary trust relationship with Mi,k for granting it the tunnel access to its 
home network Ni. Obviously, Nj needs to identify Mi,k as a valid host of Ni. 
Note that in this case Mi,k receives just the tunnel connection to Nj and the 
decision whether Mi,k will also be given the actual access to the Internet is 
carried out by Ni without any necessary involvement of Nj.
4.3  Legal aspects
4.3.1  Liability for illegal content
The reasoning applied here above with respect to the direct Internet access 
scenario is valid in this case. Undeniably, the role of both networks as tech-
nical intermediaries has not changed: the only difference is that the pro-
vider granting access to the Internet is no longer the guest network Nj but 
the home network Ni. Both networks remain ‘information society provid-
ers’ according to article 12 of the e-commerce Directive and can therefore 
benefit from the exemption of liability for the illegal content that would be 
transmitted through the services that they provide (see Section).
4.3.2  Contractual issues
Trust and legal relationship between the networks Ni and Nj As to the trust and 
legal relationship between Ni and Nj, the observations made for the direct 
Internet access case in Section are still valid in this scenario. Indeed, the 
need for a legally binding document (by mean of a mutual agreement of 
via a third party AA) will be valuable in order to put down all requirements 
that have to be met by the networks involved in the roaming project.
However, one should pay attention to the fact that the tunnel opened 
by Nj via the Internet to the home network Ni can be used as a gate by 
unauthorized intruders. Therefore, the binding document to be accepted 
by both networks should specify precisely under which conditions the tun-
nel can be opened and what will be the responsibilities of each network 
concerning unauthorized access.
Legal relationship between Mi,k and networks Ni and Nj The reasoning held 
above can apply in this scenario since Mi,k will still have to comply with the 
potential document stating his obligations regarding the use of the Inter-
net and the access to the network.
The only difference is that Mi,k shall not directly access the whole Inter-
net through Nj’s network but through Ni’s network. Therefore, Mi,k will 
still have to apply the already existing Ni’s Internet use policy (if any).
Specific contractual issues As said here above, some Internet providers 
prohibit the resale or public distribution of the Internet connection pro-
vided with other people than the users having subscribed to the Internet 
access.










In this specific scenario, the guest network Nj is not offering a direct and 
unlimited Internet access through its network: Nj only provides Mi,k with a 
tunnel - via the Internet - so that Mi,k can connect to its home network Ni 
and eventually access the Internet via Ni’s Internet provider.
Although Nj does not offer a direct Internet connection to Mi,k, the crea-
tion of a tunnel implies the use of the Internet connection provided to Nj 
by its Internet provider. As a consequence, this could still be considered 
as a breach of Nj’s contractual obligation not to share its Internet access 
with third parties. However, attention should be paid to the exact wording 
of the clause prohibiting Nj to share its Internet access (if any) in order to 
make sure that such use (the mere creation of a tunnel) is also forbidden 
by the terms and conditions of Nj’s Internet provider.
4.3.3  Telecommunication issues
Our previous analysis of electronic communications issues in Section will 
remain valuable in this scenario of roaming with tunnel access.
The nature of the service or network (public or private for example) and, 
hence, the precise legal position of the person who would like to open his 
WiFi access points to outside users in order to create a tunnel access to Ni 
will mostly depend on the concrete implementation of the WiFi roaming 
solution on the market: would the service be provided against payment, 
would the access be open to anyone, etc.? The fact that the only available 
communication will come through this tunnel is not relevant.
4.3.4  Data protection issues
Processing personal data In the WiFi scenario with tunnel access, we can 
mainly identify two processing operations: one for the admission of Mi,k 
and one for the need of creating the tunnel and managing the exchange 
of messages between Nj and Ni when Mi,k is accessing the Internet or the 
network of Ni through the tunnel.
47
These processing operations of personal data need to be performed in 
accordance with the national rules transposing the general Data Protec-
tion Directive 95/46, as more extensively explained in Section as regards 
the WiFi roaming scenario with direct access.
However, one important point that has to be underscored at this stage 
is that the guest network Nj would - in this scenario - probably be qualified 
as being a processor and not a controller of the personal data processing. If 
it can be argued that the person who determines the purposes and means 
of the processing is not the guest network Nj, but another (legal) person, 
that other person will be the controller of the processing. That person 
47 Both are however linked in a manner that one could argue that only one processing is at stake here. 
The same reasoning could besides be held for the processing operations described in Section.









shall have the entire responsibility of complying with the data protection 
rules. The guest network Nj, being only a processor shall have to follow the 
instructions of the controller (these obligations and the liability issues 
shall have to be laid down in a written contract): it will process the per-
sonal data on behalf of another person. In our opinion, the tunnel scenario 
allows the possibility for the legal entity ALAWN or AA (if any) of being a 
controller, while the participating networks will follow the way ALAWN or 
AA imposes the data to be processed (e.g. the way the admission phase 
should be performed, the tunnel created): they will be processors.
Data retention As for the WiFi roaming with direct access, some data 
retention obligations could be imposed on Nj if it can be qualified as a pro-
vider of publicly available electronic communications services. On the contrary, 
the home network Ni, as it is only accepting connections of members of its 
own network would not be such kind of provider and would consequently 
not have a data retention obligation. Nonetheless, as far as data reten-
tion is concerned, as already explained in Section , there are currently no 
precise rules to apply in Belgium and reference should be made to the 
European Directive on the matter.48
4.4  Security aspects
This section focuses on the main security threats in case of WiFi roam-
ing where the guest network Nj establishes the communication tunnel 
between the mobile device Mi,k and its home network Ni. Similar to the 
WiFi roaming case with direct access we describe security goals from the 
perspective of the participating mobile devices and networks.
4.4.1  Device-oriented security goals
The result of the admission phase in this WiFi roaming scenario is the 
establishment of the tunnel between Mi,k and Ni. Through this tunnel Mi,k 
can obtain Internet connection granted by Ni. Again, we first address the 
confidentiality of the transmitted information which can be seen as an 
optional security goal in case the established tunnel connection is used for 
the transmission of some sensitive data. Unlike the case with direct access 
the establishment of the tunnel is an explicit action of the WiFi roaming 
admission protocol. Therefore, it should be possible to ensure an end-to-
end secure tunnel between Mi,k and its home network Ni, thus, preventing 
Nj from eavesdropping the communication which is forwarded from the 
tunnel.
Further we address the problem of impersonation. A malicious guest 
network Nj may try to convince Mi,k that the tunnel is established with the 
home network Ni whereas in reality the tunnel ends at some point which 
48 Directive 2006/24/EC, op.cit.











is not Ni, i.e. by spoofing the address of Ni. Therefore, we require that 
a secure WiFi roaming solution for the tunnel access should allow Mi,k 
to authenticate the network to which the tunnel is established as its own 
home network Ni. Note that unlike the case of WiFi roaming with direct 
access to the Internet there is no need to consider scenarios where mali-
cious Nj tries to spoof other destinations on the Internet since Mi,k obtains 
its Internet connection from its home network Ni which is assumed to be 
trusted. Still the problem remains when such attacks are performed by 
some outsider adversary which manipulates the traffic exchanged between 
Mi,k and some destination on the Internet as it travels between Ni and the 
destination. Again, this is the task of the application executed on top of 
the established communication channel.
In addition to that we consider potential impersonation attacks by the 
guest network Nj which acts pretending to be some valid host of Ni. The 
risk here is that Nj may obtain the Internet connection, perform illegal 
activities, and later shift the liability claims for these activities on to Mi,k. 
A similar threat comes from modifications of the tunnel traffic and from 
the injection of messages into the tunnel in the name of Mi,k. Note that 
these problems may occur either during the admission phase if the latter 
requires interaction with Ni or during the actual communication phase, 
i.e., after the establishment of the tunnel between Mi,k and Ni. Therefore, 
we require that a WiFi roaming solution with tunnel access should pre-
vent the malicious guest network Nj from being able to impersonate Mi,k 
towards Ni.
4.4.2  Guest Network-oriented security goals
Obviously, the guest network Nj is interested in not to be blamed for the 
illegal activities on the Internet performed by any mobile device Mi,k which 
obtains access to the Internet from the tunnel established by Nj. There-
fore, it is important that Nj is able to authenticate each mobile device as a 
valid host of some home network Ni prior to the establishment of the tun-
nel. Moreover, from the admission protocol Nj should be able to obtain 
some proof that the tunnel connection has been established towards Ni 
in order to present this proof in case of accusations. This includes the 
necessity of authenticating the home network Ni to which the tunnel is 
established. Again, the form of this proof depends on the legal framework 
which applies to this WiFi roaming scenario. It can be realized by crypto-
graphic authentication techniques such as digital signatures or by logging 
the connection details. Additionally, if some pre-agreement between the 
networks exists which regulates payment responsibilities among the roam-
ing participants; this proof could also be used by Nj to claim charges for 
the provided roaming service.
Further concerns of the guest network Nj include potential damages to 
its infrastructure caused by some malicious device Mi,k. Similar to the WiFi 










roaming case with direct Internet access we consider protection against 
possible infiltrations of the guest network’s infrastructure with malware 
out of scope of the secure WiFi roaming solution for the tunnel access. 
However, we require that Nj should be protected against possible Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks that may result from the use of this solution. There 
is one significant difference to the scenario with direct access. Namely, the 
whole traffic from Mi,k will be forwarded over the established tunnel to Ni. 
This eliminates certain risks for the infrastructure of Nj and lowers the risk 
of DoS attacks against it. Nevertheless, the risk of DoS attacks against the 
WiFi roaming service itself remains and has to be handled by the deployed 
WiFi roaming solution.
4.4.3  Home Network-oriented security goals
In contrast to WiFi roaming case with direct access, the home network 
Ni in the case with tunnel access is always active, i.e., it is seen as the end-
point of the tunnel and has, therefore, to accept or decline its establish-
ment. This imposes several threats against Ni. First, Ni would usually accept 
the tunnel if it is assured that the mobile device which requests the tun-
nel is one of its legitimate hosts. Hence, it is important for Ni to be able 
to authenticate the validity of Mi,k. This, should be done not only prior 
to accepting the tunnel but also during the actual communication as a 
malicious guest network Nj may try to inject messages into the established 
tunnel.
In case that some WiFi roaming pre-agreement between Nj and Ni exists, 
possibly through some third party such as the authentication authority AA, 
the home network Ni should be able to authenticate Nj prior to accepting 
the tunnel connection. This authentication mechanism may also involve 
the authentication authority AA in case that the pre-agreement between 
Nj and Ni is indirect. If the pre-agreement also specifies the payment 
responsibilities of the involved roaming participants then Ni should be 
able to obtain some proof that would be sufficient for Ni to protect itself 
against illegitimate financial claims from Nj. The form of this proof should 
be specified within the legal framework which applies to this WiFi roam-
ing scenario. The proof can be realized via cryptographic authentication 
techniques or by logging the communication details.
4.5  Practical realization
In the tunnel mode, the first building block of the technical realization 
is similar to the one used in the case of a direct access (cf. Section 3.5.1), 
that is the link layer authorization and authentication of the mobile device 
can be solved in the same way. The following items discuss the different 
facets of the tunnel establishment and the Internet connectivity for the 
case with the tunnel access.










4.5.1  Owner of the mobile node IP address
The mobile node can obtain an IP address belonging to either the guest 
network Nj or its home network Ni. Since the whole data is tunneled to 
Ni, the use of an address from the space of addresses maintained by Nj 
requires address translation. On the other hand, using an address of Ni 
may involve the need for specific mechanisms to discover which address 
to allocate and how to distribute it.
4.5.2  Tunneling between Nj and Ni
Tunneling can be performed using a simple IP-over-IP tunnel, i.e., by add-
ing another IP header with the IP address of Ni as the destination address. 
This solution imposes additional constraints on Nj, as the guest network 
has to be aware of Mi,k at the IP level and allocate, therefore, addresses 
according to the policy of the home network Ni.
Another solution, called L2TP49, uses layer-2 tunnels to transmit data 
between two end-points over the Internet. The L2TP tunnel can be used by 
Nj to address Mi,k at the data-link layer (e.g. using IEEE 802.1X
35), which in 
turn is considered by the tunnel end-point in Ni as part of its physical link. 
Additionally, L2TP permits to proxy EAP authentication session between 
the mobile and its home network.
4.5.3  IP address allocation policy
If the IP address of the mobile device should belong to the space of 
its home network, a way to pick and distribute this address has to be 
decided. Several request-response rounds have to be avoided as much 
as possible since they impose significant delays during the connection 
phase.
A first solution could be to allocate statically and a priori a different 
IP address to any mobile that registers with Ni. This solution does not 
need any communication between the mobile node and its home net-
work when it connects to a guest network. However, this solution does 
not permit the mobile device changing its address on its own and can be 
used to track Mi,k if its address never changes. The IP address could also 
be attributed by a Ni server once Mi,k is authenticated in the same way 
as DHCP does40&41. This address could be included in the connection 
acceptance message.
Third, an entire /64 IPv6 prefix could be allocated (statically or not) to 
each mobile node. This solution should work great but is nevertheless an 
important address wasting.
49 W. TOWNSLEY, A. VALENCIA, A. RUBENS, G. PALL, G. ZORN, and B. PALTER, ‘Layer Two Tun-
neling Protocol “L2TP’’’, RFC 2661, IETF, Aug. 1999.









Finally, IPv6 router advertisements43 (or secure ones50) can be used in 
the same way as if all the mobile nodes were on the same link. It permits 
Mi,k to freely choose its own addresses. Note that some configuration has 
to be performed on the LAN in order to avoid that unneeded multicast 
messages.
4.6  Existing solutions
The only recently proposed approach addressing the citywide WiFi roam-
ing1 does not rely on a pre-established federation of networks. The guest 
network Nj accepts just any device without authenticating it and grants 
it a tunneled access to its home network Ni using VPN and NAT traver-
sal techniques with the assistance of the STUN server that resolves cur-
rent IP bindings. Thus, the guest network acts purely as a mediator of the 
communication mitigating the authentication task to the home network, 
which itself can be malicious. The authors propose to cut-off the connec-
tion if the home network does not respond within a certain time interval. 
This approach bears various legal risks resulting from the misuse of the 
granted connection since the guest network does not receive any informa-
tion which would be useful to protect it from the legal claims that may 
arise later. We stress that in WiFi roaming some mechanism allowing the 
guest network to authenticate mobile devices and to prove to the third 
parties in the case of dispute that the home network was accessed by that 
device is indispensable from the legal point of view. Nevertheless, the tun-
neling approach if refined by the necessary authentication mechanisms 
and some contractual agreement between the networks seems to be the 
most suitable form of WiFi roaming from the security point of view since 
the connection is granted to one particular address (that is of Ni) and not 
to the whole Internet.
5  Discussion and conclusion
In this section we briefly discuss and compare both presented approaches 
for WiFi roaming in terms of their mentioned legal and security aspects.
5.1  Discussion on legal aspects
From a legal view point, one can see that the legal consequences of a 
choice between a WiFi roaming with a tunnel access and a WiFi roaming 
with a direct access are rather small. Consequently, it is still difficult – at 
this stage of the study – to plead in favor of one solution.
50 J. Arkko, J. Kempf, B. Zill and P. Nikander, ‘SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)’, RFC 3971, IETF, 
March 2005.










As to the contractual issues raised in this paper, one can conclude that 
the need of a legally binding document would be valuable to lay down all 
requirements to be met by the networks involved in the roaming project.
Regarding the liability issues raised by WiFi roaming, they should remain 
almost identical in both scenarios. However, the ‘duty of care’ of the 
participating networks will be different depending upon the respective 
responsibilities of each actor.
The main question raised as to telecommunication law will still be to deter-
mine whether or not the networks at stake shall be considered as private 
or public, since both have specific legal regimes.
Concerning data protection, it is clear that both scenarios will lead to the 
co-existence of two processing operations. However, in the first scenario, 
the guest network shall probably be considered as the controller, whereas 
a third legal entity (e.g. AA) shall most likely be assumed to be the proces-
sor. The question is of importance since the controller will bear the entire 
responsibility of complying with the data protection rules.
With respect to data retention, some obligations could be imposed on the 
networks involved if they can be qualified as providers of publicly avail-
able electronic communications service. However, the lack of precise rules 
in Belgium concerning the implementation of European law prevents to 
identify clearly which providers and which data will be concerned by data 
retention obligations.
5.2  Discussion on security aspects
From the security point of view, the main difference between both WiFi 
roaming approaches is the requirement on the authentication of the 
home network Ni towards its device Mi,k. In the case of a direct access 
no such authentication is needed as the connection is established by the 
guest network Nj directly to the destination on the Internet. However, this 
imposes several security risks for the mobile device Mi,k which can be pre-
vented by the tunnel approach. The main risk results from possible imper-
sonation attacks of a malicious guest network Nj which may try to spoof the 
destination address on the Internet. This threat is no more valid in the 
case of the tunnel access as the only destination to which Nj establishes the 
connection is the home network Ni.
Furthermore, the authentication of Ni towards Mi,k allows for the 
deployment of encryption mechanisms to ensure protection of the com-
munication between Mi,k and Ni such that Nj can be kept out of reach of 
any sensitive information. Obviously, it requires less effort to deploy such 
mechanisms between Mi,k and Ni than between Mi,k and any potential des-
tination on the Internet that would be necessary in the case of the direct 
access.
Another advantage of the WiFi roaming solution based on a 
tunnel access is the lower risk of damages to the infrastructure of the guest 






network Nj since the whole traffic from the mobile device Mi,k is forwarded 
directly to Ni. This prevents unauthorized connections between alien 
mobile devices and servers located within the guest network.
On the other hand, the requirement that the mobile device Mi,k authen-
ticates itself to the guest network Nj as one of the valid hosts of its home 
network is similar in both approaches. However, also in this case the tun-
nel approach provides better flexibility as through the necessary interac-
tion with Ni the corresponding authentication of Mi,k can be performed by 
the home network ‘on the fly’.
5.3  Conclusion
Although from the legal point of view the WiFi roaming service based on 
the tunnel access does not seem to offer clear advantages compared to 
the case with the direct access, we observe that from the security point 
of view the tunnel-based solution is clearly preferable. Nevertheless, the 
additional involvement of the home network Ni into the communication 
and the overhead for the usage of tunnels may result in some efficiency 
lacks of the tunnel-based solution compared to the scenario with the direct 
access. Therefore, it is important to address efficiency concerns within the 
design of practical WiFi roaming solutions.
